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PREFACE
It is our purpose here to examine the efforts of the
United States Government to follow the pattern of European
states in implementing an effective Merchant Marine by means
of subsidy payments, and to determine whether a policy of
subsidization has effectively served the national welfare.
Although present circumstances indicate clearly that finan-
cial support of our Merchant Marine is indispensable to our
position as a world power, previous legislators were not
always of that opinion. Contemporary viewpoints must be
consulted, and historical references cited to examine the
national efforts toward a fostering of trans-oceanic
commercial activity.
From the formation of our F.epublic, merchant shipping
has been an integral part of our commercial life. The rise
and decline of this industry, the legislation enacted to aid
it, and the results in the present day have been examined,
and their effects noted.
Necessarily, current opinions as well as historical
reference must be in part the source from which such a study
is derived. Like all such histories, this will be subject
to error insofar as it may incorrectly evaluate the conditions
obtaining today.
0 Therefore it is our objective to analyze those factors
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which make a subsidy program a necessary adjunct to our
national survival, and to determine from historical fact and
opinion the elements of argument which possess the most
validity in the light of present-day conditions, which
themselves leave us no choice but to be competitively active
on the highways of ocean commerce.
Consequently, our study must commence with the founding
of our Republic in 1789, and must continue its analysis to
recent months; only in so complete a panorama can our
national necessities be revealed.
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/CHAPTER I
From its very beginnings, the United States has had a
maritime tradition, and has enjoyed a commerce which was
originally a result of its ascendancy on the high seas.
Although v;e shall trace many declines from that high position,
it is historical fact that even as an infant republic, even
as colonials, without self-government, with mercantile
restrictions, it was our good fortune to achieve importance
as a trading nation.
Our Republic was unborn when the first American ship
was launched (
1
63 1 ) in Salem, Massachusetts. This was the
event which heralded the thriving shipbuilding industry
that was later to serve as the foundation for much of our
national wealth. The trade with the British West Indies,
which was instituted at an early date, proved to be ex-
tremely profitable, especially for our fishing vessels,
which in the colonial period amounted to a kind of Merchant
Marine themselves. European nations began to call upon our
surpluses of fish, whale oil, and foodstuffs; though no
shred of credit is to be attached to it, the slave trade
rounded out completely the cycle of shipping in which our
early financial interests were engaged.
It is not our purpose here to examine the background
of our shipping and shipbuilding industries, however. Their
place in the commercial sun of the seventeenth and eighteenth
[ . t I J ' U . [
3/ • ' r ’ 1 > 3 •• v rK i . ' . i;
.
' 10
} >
'
t
•
- a .
v.» t«. :• . . >c 7tfo
:
J.l r.: it
.
• 6 . :
l r \ ' ? ' i aii
.
Yi: . i£> ; f • * * i,. J v
:
0 .0 . • JO c» JV • • J J - j
,
t
'
I
.
.
1- 0 ' o ; t i.tf ' r •> 'riJ- t i j ' cl ;
.
f
•
.
1
' •••
.
r o t rt j Fj . *0 •; ) ! •
'
. t v ; ; ) V.ii
' J >H . . ?! 4 *
.
Ji t * ipA : J a 'I j •;
'
.
•
•
'
‘
'
centuries, hampered though they were by such artificial
controls as the Eritish Navigation Acts, is part of our
heritage; its importance need not further be belabored.
We shall instead examine the efforts which our states-
men have exerted to imporve the status of our shipping after
the revolutionary War, and until the present time* Although
several of the colonies passed such legislation antedating
the War of Independence, it remained for our Congress to
take the most effective steps which had yet been made,
steps which were predicated in part upon the severe decima-
tion of our fleet by wartime activity, and in part upon a
recognition of the importance of a merchant marine for
national defense* In this latter respect, our early Con-
gresses showed more far-sightedness, youthful and unfounded
though they were, than have many of our lawmakers since*
An examination of the legislation adopted between 1789 and
1830 shows that no less than fifty acts were passed which
in one way or another affected our ocean shipping. 1
In the efforts which England was making toward the
protection of her own fleet, the West Indian Islands whEre
formerly had existed a ready market for American products,
2
were almost entirely closed to us, under the British rule
^-American Bureau of Shipping, The American Merchant
Marine (Was&iiington: American Bureau of Shipping, 1933), P* 4
2The British General Order in Council of March 24, 1786 .
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which restated that foreign vessels were excluded from the
West Indian trade, and American products such as whalebone
and whale oil were no longer welcome in any British ports.
Our answer was the first Tariff Act of July 4, 1789, which
contained provisions specifically designed to foster the
American shipping and shipbuilding industries.
^
Our fleet in 1789 comprised only 123,893 gross ocean-
going tons, roughly the equivalent of ten modern first-
4line steamers in carrying capacity. It is small wonder
that our first Congress should so preoccupy itself with
our shipping interests; it was a question of commercial
survival. The incentives of colonial days had been removed
by foreign market restrictions, high tonnage duties, and
discriminatory tariffs. Increasing national development
was calling into other fields much of the capital and
enterprise which had formerly been devoted to maritime
activity.
The Act of 1789 was the first legislative means used
to foster our shipping. It was not a subsidy act, since
no federal monies were disbursed at any time under its
provisions, but it represented financial assistance of a
kind, and was the background for other mone forthright aid
3s ee below.
4Glover, J. G., and Cornell, W. B. "The Development of
American Industries," 2nd Edition, (New York; Prentice-Hall,
1946), p. 628
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in later years.
A blanket ten per cent rebate of import duties was
provided on any goods brought to our ports in American
bottoms; the tariff on tea was specifically stated to be
twelve cents per pound if imported in an American vessel,
and twenty-seven cents per pound if in a foreign vessel.
5
This latter provision served effectively to exclude all
foreign carriage of tea to United States ports, since no
shipper could reasonably expect to absorb such a differen-
tial in duty.
Tonnage duties, which may be defined as clearance fees
in port, were set at six cents per gross ton for vessels of
American registry, thirty cents per gross ton for vessels of
American construction and foreign registry, and fifty cents
per gross ton for all others.^ It is readily apparent what
effect fees of this kind would have on the shipping industry*
and although it would be senseless to ascribe the improve-
ment in our commerce entirely to this or other laws, there
was herein at least the germ of assistance.
Congress throughout the last decade of the eighteenth
century kept a watchful eye on the progress which our
shipping companies were making, and implemented its watch-
^Paine, Ralph D. “The Old Merchant Marine." Chronicles of
America Series, (New Haven; Yale, University Press, 1919) p.96
6Ibid., p. 97.
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fulness with legislation calculated to relieve as far as
possible the onus of foreign competition. We approached
the critical period of the Napoleonic Wars with our ocean-
going shipping in the ascendancy.
In 1793 provision was made for payment of a bounty of
from one dollar sixty cents to four dollars per ton for
fish caught by American fisher vessels, to serve as an
inducement for the furnishing af a "sea militia" training
ground. ? The small margins of profit to which the fisheries
had been reduced by the closing of the lucrative foreign
markets made such a stpp necessary if we were to call any
of our young men into the maritime service. A further
incentive in the same act was the payment of two dollars
per month by the government to each of the crew of approved
fishing vessels. This was the first direct federal payment
made to ship-owners for operating; the beginnings of our
present government antedated its passage by only four years.
Other legislation, of a less pointed kind, also served
to attract native capital and labor into marine industries.
The harbor fortifications law of 1794, the provisions for
furnishing marine and meteorological information to vessels,
and the Act of 1790 relating to American seamen, ®were in-
?Spears, John R. "The Story of the American Merchant
Marine. "(New York^ Macmillan Company, 1910), p. 199-200
8 It was on this law that a later Congress was to base the
Act of 1915 « the Bill of Rights of American seamen.
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dications of a paternalistic approach which was to prevail
throughtthe so-called "Golden Age” of American shipping,
and which would not be evidenced entirely by fiscal measures.
The Congress in 1794 appropriated a sum sufficient to build
six frigates, for the immediate purpose of subduing the
Earbary pirates, who had long harassed our shipping, and for
the long-run purpose of implementing the merchant marine by
furnishing a Navy which could assure its place on the high
seas.
A history which confines itself to government aid tends
occasionally to overemphasize its influence on the progress
of an industry. How the seacaptains of New England would
have scoffed had they been told that their supremacy in this
period was due to Congressional help ! There is no question
that the superiority of American seamanship, which was to
make the clipper ship for a time the dominant ocean-going
vessel, was of prime importance, and that the background of
a maritime heritage and the quality of American shipbuilding
were important adjuncts to the progress which we displayed.
From all causes, at any rate, the first twenty years of our
country's life were marked by a phenomenal growth of tonnage
afloat on the commercial lanes of the world (Figure 1).
A realistic analysis must necessarily give due credit
to the conflict in Europe. Even the most enthusiastic
Congress could not legislate markets into existence; it
remained for Napoleon to exercise his talents in activities
f
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Year Gross Ocean-going Tons
1789 123,893
1790 355,070
1792 411,438
1793 447,000
1800 667,107
1807 840,163
1808 765,252
1809 906,855
1810 981,019
1811 948,247
Figure 1. Early growth of American ocean-
going shipping, selected years.
9
of a market-creating nature. The wars, which lasted in-
termittently from 1793 until 1814, took the British and
French laborer, especially the farmer from his normal activ-
ities and left a productive void which was best filled by
American surpluses; these surpluses commanded high engugh
shortage prices in an eager European market to serve as
additional incentive to the entrepreneur who chose to carry
them there. Therefore, we must not ascribe our tremendous
growth in shipping entirely to local causes; as the leading
neutral we enjoyed a position as belligerent supplier
which swelled the ranks of our fleet and called more of our
young men into the profitable marine trade. The income
was not confined to the producers; merchant owndrs of vessels
the officer®, and even the crews enjoyed a portion of the
9oata assembled from; Spears, John E., Op.cit., p. 146-147;
Paine, Kalph D.
,
op. cit., p. 98; Bogart, E.L., and
Kemmerer, D. L. “Economic History of the American People,"
2nd Edition. New York, 1948. p. 193.
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war-born prosperity. Although the depredations of both the
French and the British contributed to the War of 1812, we
cannot deny that at first the stimulus of a ready foreign
market was a temptation that few of our mariners could
resist.
Several reasons have been advanced for our supremacy
on the high seas during this period. The fact that American
vessels were seen in all the major ports of the world, and
that American shipping interests became prosperous are our
best indications that there was more to our early merchant
marine than simply a romantic tradition of hardy sailors
braving the terrors of the deep. Although it is true that
the adventurous spirit of the Americans made itself felt,
there are sound commercial reasons behind the tremendous
increase which took place in the first decades of the
nineteenth century.
The Napoleonic wars have been mentioned above. The
virtual disappearance of French, Dutch, Spanish, and even
many British merchantmen from the major world trade routes,
coupled with war-born shortages in each of these countries,
served as a primary impetus to our growth. The close prox-
imity of ocean to forest in North America had always meant
shipbuilding, and the increasing urbanization of the eastern
seaboard was increasing as well the demand for foreign mar-
kets. In spite of the unfavorable conditions, notably the
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restriction of our freedom on the high seas, it is apparent
that there were many sustaining causes which were natural
economic factors. It is interesting to conjecture as to
whether the natural operation of economic laws would have
independently produced these results, and whether government
aid can be properly evaluated only during much later periods.
It is impossible for us, even from the vantagepoint of
hindsight, to attempt to ascribe to each governing cause
its true value in producing the effects which have become
shipping history. In succeeding chapters we shall attempt
to appraise certain of these effects, as they became a
function of government assistance.
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CHAPTER II
Although the War of 1812 gave us considerable pause In
our shipping progress, with its end in 1815 we had the op-
portunity to enjoy the supremacy to which our tradition of
shipbuilding and seamanship entitled us. No longer beset
by British and French interference, our Marine entered its
Golden Age.
This period was unique in that no special steps were
taken by our Congress to help the merchant shipping industry.
Aid was almost entirely lacking, except insofar as the
tariff, by now an American institution, helped to prevent
foreign competition for American registry. It is true
that the regulations already passed concerning coastwise
shipping were still in effect, and were to endure with only
minor variations until the present time, but our ocean-
going trade began to be carried to a greater extent in
American bottoms largely because of their superiority to
others. The vast soft-wood forests of the American
coastal regions, and the hardiness and training of her
officers and crews eminently equipped her to compete with
the finest that other countries could offer. With the
sailing vessel, the American merchant marine reached its
zenith. (Appendix A)
In 1816 a shipping company called the Black Ball Line,
with routes from New York to Liverpool, began a regularly
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scheduled service which continued almost without interruption
for sixty years. On the first and sixteenth days of each
month a packet left New York harbor for England; neces-
sarily, this company enjoyed a prosperous life at first,
skimming the cream from all ocean-going traffic, and com-
manding the highest rates for express and passengers. The
slower "tramp" sailer carried the heavy cargoes on which
no premium for fast carriage or regular trips existed, but
the Black Ball Line was for many years the most famous and
the most regularly patronized of all the sailing ship con-
cerns, ^ whose number during this time was legion.
In point of fact, a history which attempts to portray
the efforts of government at aiding an industry should
hardly dwell upon that period when the industry would have
no claim for aid. The era of the fast packet, and the
almost immediately following period of the American clipper
ship, were times when a Congress would have thought such
efforts wasted. However, if only to afford a contrast with
the later periods, when our government was beset with
petitions to restore the United States to her proper place
on the high seas, it is well for us at least briefly here
to summarize the characteristics of these halcyon days of
sail.
^Paine, Ralph D., op. cit., p. 137 .
. •; t'Ki 'io
* 5
. ;o
. •
r
f '111 J & c -< . o **. )' . (<f i
„ ...
Jad
*
'- J
,
f
,
•- * S
. .
. ;
' WO '"'2 ^ Jjfc i, :ff i . .*! v. \ \ - .)/.
V ' '
.»o./ y •t
'"
! 5 • I ?)
r
•
.
7.
' f
-.v
-c, ,
^ » iov • •' •, -• »riJ :o -oj ^ tr.. > . *j > .• - 0 .
; - i .t
With the building of the first true clipper, a sailing
veseel especially designed for speed and requiring outstan-
ding abilities on the part of officers and crew if her full
talents were to be utilized, the United States gained a
place in world commerce which she held upon the advent of
the improved steamship. Even the tea trade between the far
east and the British Isles was largely carried by American
clippers, many of which held speed records which have never
been duplicated by sailing ships, and some of which are not
p
customarily equalled by today's ordinary steamers.
That seamanship was an important functional part of
this era is unmistakeable. The peculiar construction of
the clipper, which often seemed in appearance to be a
glossy shell surmounted by thousands of yards of sail, made
it an especially difficult ship to manage. Tales are told
of seacaptains who used padlocks on the rigging, lest some
chary bluejacket become too frightened by the submersion of
the lee rail in solid water, and attempt to take in sail;
and whether they all be true or not, the legends of our
special aptitude for sailing these sea-going greyhounds
must originally have possessed a germ in fact. 3
The clipper owners needed no Congressional edict to
maintain their position. The mail was carried across the
2 Paine, Ralph D.
,
op. cit., p. 142.
3 ibid., p. 166 .
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seas at express rates, with no hint of extra payments in the
form of subsidies. Had it not been for the advent of steam
in maritime commerce, it is likely that we would still pos-
sess the high place which we once enjoyed, and that Congres-
sional action would never have been suggested as a means to
trading power.
As in many other branches of endeavour, this country
was first with an inventor of a practical steam-driven ship.4
In 1807 the Clermont , designed and built by one Robert
Fulton, travelled upstream from ftest Street pier in New
York City, to Albany, without once having recourse to sail;
a dozen years later the Savannah , on May 24, 1819 sailed
from New York to Liverpool, using steam for almost one
eighth of the journey. Having established its primacy, so
to speak, America immediately rested on its collective
laurels and proceeded almost entirely to ignore the place
of steam propulsion in the commercial world, allowing other
countries rapidly to outdistance her in the development of
this kind of vessel.
In many respects it is not surprising that the American
ship-owners and merchants paid so little attention to the
development of steamer commerce. Although the inland rivers
4Steam power had been experimentally applied to boats many
years before Fulton's Clermont made her voyage; however, it
is generally conceded that this was the first practical
vessel ever constructed.
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and even certain of the coastal waterways were soon plied
with steamships, the outstanding superiority of the noble
clipper seemed hardly deposable by the squat, ugly, and,
strangely enough, considerably slower stesm vessel, with its
high costs of operation and its drastically different con-
struction. American interests had become accustomed to
wooden hulls with slender, speed-designed lines, which
laboring under the churning impulses of the marine steam
engines of that day would under any kind of pressure be
torn to pieces in high-seas operations within a materially
short period. The so-called elastic hull, which was designe
to adapt itself to wind and wave with a minimum of torsion,
was hardly usable with steam engines.
It is natural that American entrepreneurs would not
abandon in favor of any unknown quantity that high position
which their sailing vessels had achieved. It is equally
natural that England, suffering from inferiority, would
devote time and effort, and within a few years national
monies, to the development of steamships. Historians have
decried this signal evidence of American somnolence; it
seems unfair to deplore an attitude of mind which was so
consistent with the then known conditions. The owner of
a Dreadnought or a Flying Cloud would have agreed with the
concensus which held him foolish had he been so impractical
as to attempt to replace these mistresses of the ocean with
as untried a contrivance as an ocean-going steamer.
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It was in 1839 that the British Parliament first made
a subsidy award, and that to the C’unard Line for ocean-
going service to the Western Hemisphere. 5 Her previous
attitude toward British shipping companies had been
similar to ours: cooperative and protective, but seldom
remunerative. We may trace most of our history of subsidies
to this act of Parliament, after which we were soon to model
our own legislation. Operating under a stipulation that
awards were for steamships only, Cunard began regularly
scheduled voyages to the United States in 1840, and has
continued that service ever since, permanently and securely
sponsored by British Empire revenues in the form of generous
mail contracts.
We have often looked to the British commonwealth for
guidance in commercial lawmaking. It is not surprising
that shortly thereafter (1845) our Congress should have
seen fit to pass a series of acts calculated to protect
American shipping from foreign competition, and to make
grants designed to bring the high American shipbuilding
and operating costs closer to the gross income figures
which British subsidies made competitively necessary. Con-
jecture has been made since as to whether it was the poor
^Spears, John R.
,
op. cit., p. 254.
^Spears, „ohnR., loc. cit.
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choice of the American company which was to receive the
most important of the grants (1847) rather than any basic
fallacies in the policy itself, which made our first at-
tempt at subsidization such a remarkable failure at giving
us a position on the ocean steam routes.
It was an apprehensive eye which Congress and our
shipping companies cast at the fledgling Cunard Line
which already, two trying years after its first operation,
was beginning to take from American holds much of the prize
cargo and premium express, and from American cabins most of
the time-conscious passengers. While figures indicate that
under optimum conditions the best clippers could make
shorter runs than could the Cunarders, it is obvious that
these conditions could not always prevail,'7 and that the
best clippers comprised only a small part of our fleet.
Small reason that the businessman, guided by market motives
rather than abstract patriotism, should choose the Cunard
steamship, which completed its run adverse winds notwith-
standing, within a surprisingly unvariable interval, rather
than the more spectacular clipper, which might shatter a
record with his cargo aboard, or might on the other hand
be bested by unfavorable winds, causing him losses which
several voyages might not recoup.
7Even the Dreadnought . which often completed the Boston-
Liverpool run in less than fourteen days, was known once
to have required fifty-eight days due to contrary winds.
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Consequently in 1842 Thomas Butler King, Chairman of
o
the House Naval Committee in Congress, proposed two bills
which were aimed at circumventing the rapidly changing
picture in England’s favor. Their provisions can be
summarized as follows: the Postmaster General of the
United States was to be empowered to enter into contracts
with shipping companies if such companies would fulfill
schedules which he approved; such contracts were to run
for at least four years and not more than ten years, re-
newable at the option of the Postmaster General; such
companies as were approved must hold themselves ready to
transport the United States mails between their ports of
call; in consideration of such contracts, the Congress was
to appropriate funds sufficient to cover the reasonable
cost of such service.
After nearly two years of consideration, the Congress
passed both of these bills in their original substance as
the Act of 1845, and immediately negotiations were entered
into with various shipping companies which had expressed
an interest in steamship operation. It was apparent that
no sailing vessel could possibly fulfill the commitment to
regular scheduling, regardless of bow precise its sailing
dates might be. As a consequence it was several months
^HR 68l and HR 685
,
28th Congress, 1st session.
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before shipbuilding could be started, and the companies
which received awards were not operative until late in
1846.
Among the first were several small coastwise steamers
already in operation when the Act was passed. The most
famous of these lines, all of whose subsidies were small
in amount, was the New York and Charleston Steamship Com-
pany, which with its S.S. Southerner , followed soon after-
ward by the S.S. Northerner
,
plied between New York and
southern ports with mail, express, passengers, and the kinds
of cargo which for many years had been transmitted by
coastal shipping. It is not to operations of this kind
to which we must direct our prime attention. More impor-
tant were the ocean-going companies, for those were the
enterprises calculated to derive most benefits from the
legislation.
On May 8, 1846 the Ocean Steam Navigation Company was
incorporated for the purpose of conducting scheduled steam-
ship operations between New York and Bremen, via Southampton
and Le Havre. However, even with the subsidy of $400,000
per year which the Postmaster General authorized for this
company, it was extremely difficult to interest American
capitalists in such an untried venture, and most of the
control finally rested in foreign hands. Two ships, the
S.S. Washington and the S.S. Hermann were put under con-
struction, and on June 1, 1847 the ?.rashln£ton completed the
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first leg of its maiden voyage at Southampton. This and all
later voyages of this company proved to be slow and costly;
the Cunard company’s regular trips in every case took less
time than those of the Ocean Steam Line. It was natural
under these circumstances that express and passengers should
still travel by the more efficient British vessels, which
9
were granted another increase in subsidy'to counteract the
possible effects of our Congressional action. Throughout
its life, this Ocean Steam Line suffered from financial
difficulties since it was insufficiently capitalized and
faced with substantial debt, and was encumbered by the
lack of engineering techniques in this country for the
proper construction and maintenance of steam vessels.
Part of the justification for the subsidies was the
claim that a large merchant marine would serve as a
reservoir of naval strength in the event of war. It is
unlikely that the vessels sponsored by the legislation of
1845 would have been especially valuable against those
already perfected by European states, most of which had been
forced to make strides born of necessity in the development
of ocean-going steam engineering. It was a natural con-
sequence that before 1850 all other major powers were our
superiors in the designing, building, and operating of
9ciark, William H. "The Story of our Merchant Marine"
(Boston £ ia3fc* Page & Company, 1938), p. 258
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steamships, and that the naval auxiliary argument is more
valid today than it was a century ago.
While the Ocean Steam Navigation Company was truly a
pioneer in high seas steam operation, pointing the way for
many future companies, it was representative of the companies
subsidized by the Act of 1845 in its poor earnings. No
dividends were ever paid to its owners; even the liberal
subsidy which Congress allowed was insufficient to cover
the margin of high maintenance and operating costs, far in
excess of those of the Cunard company, with its lower wage
scales and its acquired skills in extracting the longest
useful life from a steam vessel. Despite the earnest and
continuing efforts of its principals, it is not surprising
that the company was moribund even before its subsidy was
finally withdrawn ( 1858 ) by an economy-minded Congress.
Our efforts at control of Atlantic shipping remained
ineffective; the Act of 1845 was at best a halfway measure,
especially since the operations of the Royal Mail Steam
Packet Company began to expand Great Britain's control
through the Caribbean. This concern, heavily subsidized
by the British Parliament, served to stifle still further
our shipping in the West Indies, although it must be con-
fessed that the supposedly commercial motives of the British
,10
*-°The Royal Mail Company's first subsidy was the then
staggering sum of $1,200,000, awarded in 1841.
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government are weakened by close examination. The ships of
the Royal Mail line, built according to Admiralty specifica-
tions and manned by officers of the British Navy, carried
almost no mail, and made stops at British ports in the
Caribbean hardly long enough to load express and permit
passengers aboard. It was obvious that the Royal Mail's
subsidy was geared as much to threats of war between Great
Britain and the United States and to a British desire for a
trans-Nicaraguan canal as it was to an effort to foster
British commercial interests.
The 1845 subsidies, then, proved to be a failure,
except with regard to the coastwise shippers which were
flourishing before the Act and might easily, under the
restrictive rule of the Act of 1817 which limited to
American bottoms all coastwise traffic, have continued
to prosper even without such a subsidy.
More productive was the Marine Act of March 3, 1847,
which extended the power of the Postmaster General to con-
tract with steamship operators, and which increased the
appropriation allowable for mail payments. "Ye shall not
examine the operations of the small companies which made
an effort to capitalize upon its provisions, nor even such
lines as the New York and Havre Steam Navigation Company
which, though well financed and generously aided by a
subsidy of $150,000 per year, never achieved recognition,
failing to compete effectively even with the American lines
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which vied with it.
Rather we shall consider the two most important
ODerations which stemmed from this piece of legislation.
The United States Mail Steamship Company was authorized to
conduct regular operations between New York and Panama, via
coastal cities, to transport all United States Mails bound
for the west coast of the United States, and to receive for
its efforts a grant of $290,000 per year. The adjunctive
route^from the west coast of the Panama Isthmus were
granted to the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, which was to
connect by overland route across the isthmus, and would
complete the journey to California for a subsidy of
$308,000 per year. September, 1848 saw the first voyage
of this joint operation, which was to continue regularly
until the subsidy was withdrawn ten years later.
Both of these companies were financially successful 5^
it is worthy of note, however, that over a dozen small
companies operating sailing clippers also made money from
these routes, even though they were forced to sail around
Cape Horn to achieve their western goal. We must therefore
attribute only part of the success to the subsidy; the gold
rush to California was the primary cause. Passenger traffic
alone was sufficient to support any transportation company
l-^Spears, John R. op. cit., p. 273»
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which could take the gold-hungry adventurers by a route
easier to negotiate than the difficult overland passage.
Even with coal at thirty dollars per ton, the steamship
companies experienced only one major cost difficulty, which
12
resolved itself well within the profitable range: high
wages had to be paid to crews to induce them not to desert
as soon as the ships docked in San Francisco.
The New York-San Francisco routes, then, were an
eminent success, and marked the first occasion? when an
ocean-going steamship company under the American flag paid
dividends to its investors. Had the traffic of later years
offered the same incentives, it is very likely that our
maritime status would sooner and more effectively have been
secured. The combination routes cited above represented
the American answer to the Royal Mail operation in the
Caribbean; it is unfortunate that the true proving-ground
should still have been the North Atlantic, where the con-
siderably less vulnerable Cunard Line continued to consoli-
date itself.
By the same act of 1947 a subsidy was granted to the
New York and Liverpool United States Mail Steamship Company,
popularly known as the Collins Line after its founder and
12Profits were so large that Commodore Cornelius Vanderbilt
was paid a $56,000 per month premium if he would agree to
keep his ships out of the traffic (Spears, op. cit., p 273)
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principal stockholder, Edward K. Collins, previously owner
of two successful coastal sailing ship concerns. It is to
this company that we turn for an analysis on the basis of
the most liberal subsidies yet offered by an enthusiastic
Congress. It is unfortunate that a major variable in the
form of Collins' breathtaking extravagance should be intro-
duced to vitiate any conclusions which might be derived
from such a study.
Collins and several of his business associates had
been instrumental in the passage of the Marine Act of 1847,
and it is likely that Congress was unduly influenced by his
claim that he would cross the Atlantic with steamships in
ten days or less. The Cunarders generally took from twelve
to fifteen days for the same voyage, and it was the Cunard
company which had thereby wrested from American shipping
13
companies most of their transatlantic traffic.
The contract between the Collins Line and the Post-
master General was signed in November, 1847, and provided
for a payment of $19,250 per voyage, which on the schedule
authorized meant an annual payment of $385,000. Stipulation
was made that at least four vessels be provided by the
company for the service, of at least two thousand tons each,
and that a federal mail agent and a naval officer be include
l^Keir, Malcolm. "The March of Commerce, "(New Havem Yale.
University Press, 1927), p. 101
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14in the complement on each voyage.
Even with a paid-in capital of $1, 200*900, Collins was
unable to pay for four ships which had an average cost of
over $700,000, and was therefore from the very beginning
faced with high debt service costs. Besides this, the
company spared no expense to make the Collins ships more
luxurious and better appointed in every way than the vessels
of the Cunard Line.
It is not surprising that within six months of the
contract negotiations, Collins was back in Washington asking
for funds, even before operations had begun. The Act of
August 3, 1848 might be called the Collins Act; its only
provision was for an advance of $25,000 per month per ship
until commissioning date, with liberal repayment terms. At
the very outset, then, we see Congress compelled by othee
than economical motives. Even the high costs which the
Collins Line was already incurring seemed worthwhile if we
could re-establish our supremacy over British shipping;
Collins boasted publicly, and reiterated his claims to the
Congress, that he would drive the Cunarders from the At-
lantic by the excellence of his operation. That Collins
should have attempted by extravagance to best the canny
Scot owners of the Cunard Line at their own kind of business
14Spears, John R. op. cit., p. 265.
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furnishes a sardonic sidelight.
The Collins vessels were completed in the spring of
1850, and authorities agreed that they were the best steam-
15
ships yet produced in American yards. 'In spite of this,
however, the hulls were not perfect for steam propulsion;
too much of the sailing vessel design remained. They
were therefore not the zenith of designing for which the
Navy Department had hoped, and consequently afforded the
Congress its first of many disappointments.
Service began with the voyage of the S.S. Atlantic
on April 27, 1850. The line was faced from the beginning
with a series of circumstances which translated our national
pride and Collins' stubbornness into high costs. In 1850
our sailing vessels were supreme on all seas except the
North Atlantic and the Caribbean. Collins was famous for
successful operation of sailing packet companies, and had
effectively been adjured by Congress to show his heels to
the Cunarders. Consequently, his captains pushed the
vessels past their operating limits, incurring extremely
high maintenance charges on already costly ships, and using
quantities of coal which in that day were phenomenal.
Later information furnished to Congress by the company
indicated that the average coal cost per voyage amounted
15Keir, Malcolm, op. cit., p. 100.
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to $8,612.28, representing nearly two thousand tons of
coal consumed between New York and Liverpool. Even so,
had this been the worst of the cost picture, the final
16
result might have been different. Q
But in one sense Collins made good his promise. In
May of 1851 his S.S. Pacific made the voyage from New York
to Liverpool in nine days, twenty hours, and in August, 1852
,
the S.S. Baltic crossed in nine days, thirteen hours. During
its term, the Collins Line began systematically to share the
enviable operating position which formerly had belonged to
the Cunard Company alone.
In answer to Collins’ challenge, the Parliament raised
the subsidy to the Cunarders to $16,500 per voyage,
stipulating in the Council directive that effort be made
to equal and surpass the Collins achievements in speed and
appointment. Since no increase whatever was seen in the
quantity of British nail which moved across the Atlantic,
we may say that this was the first time thah the British
government dropped all pretenses; tacit admission was
made that the payment represented an outright and un-
equivocal anti-competitive grant.
In a statement of average costs and revenues for the first
twenty-eight voyages, the Collins Line showed;
Revenue from passengers $21,292.65
Revenue from freights 7
,
744.20
Subsidy payment 19 . 250.00
Total per voyage 48, 286. 8^
Against expenses per voyage $65.215.59
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It was shortly thereafter that Collins presented him-
self at a Congressional committee meeting with another
petition, and because of the progress which he had made,
because full proof had not been submitted as to his ships'
inadaptability to wartime use, and because of a marked
anti-British sentiment still prevailing, his grant was
raised by Act of March 3, 1854 to $33,000 per voyage, for
twenty-six scheduled voyages per year, a total of
$858,000 for twelve months of operations. The lifeblood
of his company was consequently renewed, and he received
additional effective help with the outbreak of the Crimean
War in late March of 1854, which drew several of the Cunard
vessels into British naval service.
Collins continued his operations; package freight,
which we now call express, passengers, and mail occupied
most of his load-carrying space. It was another two years
before so-called deferrable cargoes began to be diverted
into Collins holds. Growing revenues were short-lived;
by Act of August 18
,
1856
,
the Congress suddenly gave
notice to Collins that his original subsidy rate would
soon be restored, to supplant the more recent and more
17generous grant. This was the first indication of a new
^Spears, ^°hn R. op. cit., p. 270
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Congressional economy-mindedness which within eighteen
months was to cancel all mail contracts, and repeal the
subsidy acts.
It was in 1856 that other evil descended upon the
Collins Line. Its S.S. Arctic was rammed off Cape Race
with a loss of 307 lives, and on September 23, 1856 the
Pacific sailed west from Liverpool and was never heard
from again. Although insurance proceeds in the aggregate
amount of $ 1
,
250,000 were paid to the company, the bad
publicity was extremely damaging, and it began to feel
the pinch of decreasing revenues severely, even before
the subsidy was finally cut to its original figure of
$19,250 per voyage on June 30, 1857. Service was con-
tinued, but the Panic of 1857, which was world-wide in
its scope, effectively curtailed commerce to the point
where the Collins Line reluctantly ceased operations.
The last voyage was made in January, 1858
,
and within
a few weeks a bankruptcy proceeding marked the Company's
demise.
That Congress was governed by diplomatic and military
considerations is in part true. Collins was primarily the
American answer to Cunard; that he spoke in a more spend-
thrift tongue was unfortunate. The sumptuous cabins and
silver bridge fittings of the Atlantic and the Adriatic
were not adapted to the tightness of trans-Atlantic com-
petition; these vessels felt the pinch of cost as soon as
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they were put into service. Wonder has been expressed "1
that the Collins Line managed to survive for so long a
time.
We must, however, give Collins and his associates
credit for realizing that the American merchant marine to
survive must compete with Samuel Cunard and the British
Parliament, and to the Congress which financed him for a
maritime vision and foresight which its successors did not
apparently possess. It seems likely that sectionalism
played its part in the revocation of the mail contracts in
1858, since southern Congressmen had been clamoring for
subsidies for companies serving southern ports, of which
the only one endorsed was Charleston. With the series of
calamities which plagued shipping, and notably the Collins
Line, in 1856, the Midwest, always apathetic 'to our marine
problem, added its weight, and the subsidy laws were re-
pealed.
Spears, John B. op. cit., p. 172
l^Bogart, E. L., and Kemmerer, D. L. op. cit., p. 211 .
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CHAPTER III
In the meantime, Great Britain was extending her
domain with additional subsidies to other companies, and
Germany and France entered their bids for dominance. In
the fiscal year 1850-1851 the Parliament awarded the sum
of $3,699»853 in subsidies,^ an amount more than suf-
ficient to secure for British concerns the traffic which
they so earnestly desired. The depression of ocean-going
freight rates and passenger fares as a result of foreign
subsidies was a constant tendency; even had our operations
not been harnessed by high building costs and high wage
scales, it is unlikely that American interests could have
competed effectively with the maritime forces set in play
by generous European governments. The diversion of our
domestic capital into railroads, mines, canals, and manu-
facturing establishments was inevitable, since our ex-
panding economy offered many avenues more fruitful in terms
of profit than the already declining shipping industry.
The Hamburg-American Line, subsidized by the German
government in 1846, changed entirely to steam locomotion
in l853) 2giving impetus to British generosity to its o?/n
companies, and still further weakening the position of
^•Cyclopedia of American Government, New York, 1904. p. 610.
2Mitchell, B. & L. P. "American Economic History" (Cambridge
-
- Hotfghbon-mrfflin, 19^ 7), p . 01 5
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the American interests. The North German Lloyd Steamship
Company, with liberal subsidy, was put in operation in
1856, with voyages from Bremen and Hamburg to British and
American ports, and to German colonies in Africa and the
Far Last. From the humble beginning in 1839
,
with Cunard’s
p$425)000 annual subsidy, the spread of foreign shipping
continued, subsidized not only in Britain and Germany, but
in France, Italy, and even Austro-Kungary and Japan. Com-
mercial nationalism was approaching its zenith in those
countries which had before so effectively been challenged
by our maritime standing.
For over three decades the United States watched its
shipping crowd into the hulls of foreign vessels, watched
its citizens travel under other flags, with hardly a
protest. The most articulate demands for a merchant
marine of suitable scope were virtually ignored, despite
the urgency with which pleas were made.
For example, President Arthur in his annual message
to Congress in 1882, said:
"This subject is of the utmost importance to the
national welfare. Methods of reviving American
shipbuilding and restoring the United States flag
to the ocean-carrying trade should receive the
immediate attention of Congress . 11
Nor was President Arthur the only one of our chief
^Mitchell, B.
,
& L. P. op. cit., p. 415.
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executives who expressed concern. To quote President
Harrison, also in a message to Congress:
"There is nothing more justly humiliating to
the national pride and nothing more hurtful
to the national prosperity than the inferior-
ity of our merchant marine compared with that
of other nations. I am an advocate of econo-
my in our national expenditure, but it is a
misuse of terms to make this word describe a
policy that withholds an expenditure for the
purpose of extending our foreign commerce."
Undisturbed by these adjurations, it was not until
1891 that Congress believed the situation serious enough
to warrant national cognizance, and to justify the ap-
plication of federal dollars to the assistance of the
solution. In that year less than ten per cent by value
of our foreign trade was being carried in American ves-
sels. (Appendix A)
An aroused Congress finally approved a maritime bill
which became law on March 3, 1891. Known as the Ocean
Mail Act of 1891
,
its appropriation was drastically re-
duced from its original figures even before it emerged
from Committee. Consequently, an appraisal of the results
of this new subsidization must be tempered by the economy-
mindedness which still prevailed.
The substance of the Act was the provision for grants
which it would award as mail pay to any applicant capable
of transporting the mail overseas, according to a speed
and tonnage classification established along the limits
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as Indicated here:
Class "A" vessels
Class M B” vessels
Class "C" vessels
Class "D" vessels
$4 per nautical mile
2 per nautical mile
1 per nautical mile
660 per nautical mile
With the assistance of the navy department, the law
established the specifications for each class as to
minimum tonnage and minimum top speeds:
Despite the weighty consideration apparently given
to the operating factor, the amountr allowed was insuf-
ficient. For a voyage from New York to Liverpool, for
example, the subsidy payment would amount to approximately
$3,000 per voyage for the best and fastest of existing
steam vessels* When we remember that Collins failed to
compete even with a $33,000 payment per voyage, it is
small wonder that the Act of 1891 had so little effect
upon our shipping. Certain companies already in operation
like the Pacific Mail Company and The Fed "D" Line, which
operated between New York and Venezuela, naturally wel-
comed the subsidy, but the primary purpose of the Act was
the fostering of American shipping to the point where an
auxiliary fleet of merchantmen would be available in war-
time for troop transport and scouting. A mail subsidy of
^Clark, William H. op. cit., p. 265-266.
Class A 8000 tons or over 20 knots
Class B 5000 tons or over 16 knots
Class C 2500 tons or over 14 knots 0
Class D 1500 tons or over 12 knots.
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only $4 per mile for the fleetest and heaviest of ocean-
going steamers could hardly be expected to stimulate
ship-building or capital formation.
Our most conclusive proof of the inadequacy of the
payment lies in the fact that the Postmaster General
advertised for public acceptance fifty-three major routes;
only eight operations resulted therefrom, and the total
expenditure made under the provisions of the Act
4
amounted to only $29,630,000, slightly more than the
normal poundage rate for mail, which has always been paid
even to unsubsidized vessels.
It is true that the American Line, soon to become
part of the International Mercantile Marine Corporation,
acquired four new ships as a result of its anticipation
of higher mail revenues, and the Mallory Steamship Com-
pany increased its mileage considerably, but by and
large our shipping was not greatly extended. 5 Among the
companies awarded mail pay for new routes were the
Pacific Mail Company, New York-Colon-San Francisco; the
Pacific Mail Steamship Company, San Francisco to the
Orient; the Ward Line, New York-Havana-Mexico; and the
Oceanic Steamship Company, San Francisco-Honolulu-Sydney.
An interesting commentary on the relative uselessness
4Cyclopedia of American Government, p. 614.
c
'Spears, John R. op. cit., p. 381.
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of tthls Act lies in the formation of the Red Star Line,
which was originally the International Navigation Company
of Philadelphia. Impressed by the relative liberality of
the Belgian government, which was offering a $130,000 per
year, ten year contract to a shipping company of suitable
scope, the International Navigation Company's owners
organized a Belgian subsidiary to which its facilities
were trafisf erred, and which was received under Belgian
laws the subsidy contract. Known as the Red Star Steam-
ship Company, this line was the first major steamship
concern to fly a foreign flag while owned by American
operators.
^
The principle behind the act was satisfactory. Dis-
tressed by the decline in our shipping, Congress was eager
to see an auxiliary merchant fleet reborn, and was willing
to use federal funds to promote such a happy outcome. Poor
planning and advice led to a rate structure so low as
almost entirely to nullify the good intentions displayed
by the Act's passage.
This is not to say that we as a nation were completely
unaware of our responsibility to our shipping interests.
The last decades of the nineteenth century marked a sub-
stantial growth in other service which without federal funds
?Clark, William H. op. cit., p. 266.
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would not other wise have been provided. Such things as
harbor dredging, chart publication, lighthouse building,
meteorological service, and an effidient Coast Guard
would have proved impossible for even an amalgamation of
shipping companies to support. To this extent our govern-
ment was helpful, more so even than many European states.
But our tariff policy had become protectionistic
,
which
redounded to our commercial disservice, and although the
services mentioned above were rendered without specific
fees, they did not represent positive financial aid. Com-
paratively, we must reserve the word aid for the successful
efforts of European governments.
Great Britain had begun in 1840 with its first pay-
ments to Cunard, and by 1900 could look back upon an un-
interrupted stream of subsidies to this and other companies
for a sixty-year total of $283,906,000, which was therefore
the considered British price for an effective Merchant
Marine. Although these subsidy payments were not extended
to all British shipping companies, the paternal attitude
which they indicated was an inducement to the formation
of substantial shipping capital in th$ British dominions.
The German government in 1885 renewed its contract
with the North German LLoyd Line, extending it for fifteen
years with an annual payment, nominally for mail carriage,
of $1,047,000. This contract in turn was nenewed in 1900,
i •
,
• t
.
'
,X at
•
.
,
»
'
.
*
•
.
.r -
• '
,
r
. 1 'iU. v j] U
.
r
'
r -
'»
,
.
..
i [
.
-1 ' ' : : »
. J
'
.
-
n> . > • fcr'jM v ; * r
' '
o t .‘i ?r . .
. .
'
increasing the annual amount to $1,330, 000. ? In the
meantime the 1890 contract with the Hamburg-Amer ican Line
which carried with a $214,000 annual subsidy, was also
renewed, and the amount increased to $390,000.
France paid to its merchant marine the sum of
$19,503,701 from l88l to 1890, and extended its payments
further after the turn of the century. That France is not
considered eminent as a maritime nation vas due more to
her weakness in international markets than to lack of
assistance to her shipping.
Figure 2 gives a comparison of subsidy payments made
by other governments in selected years during a period
when we were making virtually none, due to the ineffective-
ness of the Act of 1891.
Great Britain & Colonies 1909 $ 9,689,384
France 1908 13,423,737
Japan 1910 5,413,700
Italy 1909 3,872,917
Spain 1910 3,150,012
Austro-Hungary 1908 2,984,530
Germany 1908 2,301,029
Figure 2. Shipping Subsidy Payments by
Foreign Governments, Selected
Years, Equivalent in Dollars.
9
7Spears, JohnE., op. cit., p. 328 .
%eir, Malcolm, op. cit., p. 104.
^Tabulated from the Cyclopedia of American Government, p. 6©
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This is not to state, however, that all Americans
were blind to the difficulties, nor unaware of the travesty
of an increasing national production being carried to
ocean-served markets in foreign vessels. One of the most
articulate public pleaders for subsidies was the
S cientific American Magazine , which waged an editorial
battle for years, decrying the shame of a major power
being without the ships to carry its trade. Only slightly
less pressing were the editorial comments of the New York
Times and the Atlanti c Monthly .
Nor were our legislators consistently inactive. On
December 19, 1898 , Senator Hanna introduced the Hanna-
Payne Bill, which called for a review of the maritime
problem and the appointment of a commission to revise
drastically the mail payment scale; the bill was defeated
summarily. 10 On March 22, 1903, Senator W. P. Frye
introduced; a similar bill, which passed the Senate but
was defeated in the House and not recalled. 1 ^- These
abortive attempts, however, are indications that certain
of our lawmakers were not blind to the problem; that their
efforts fell short of accomplishment is not to their dis-
credit.
^Cyclopedia of American Government, p. 614.
Hlbid.
, p . 615.
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Strictly speaking, the turning point toward modern
maritime policy came with the passage of the Panama Canal
Act of 1912. Although we have seen considerable lapses
since into the apathetic attitude displayed prior to its
passage, we may select this year as the time when an
awakening populace began to realize the tremendous need
for suitable ocean shipping, and became aware that normal
progressive forces were not sufficient to give such an
industry stimulus.
The most important provision of the Panama Canal Act
was the stipulation that foreign-built vessels less than
five years old might be admitted to American registry for
coastwise or foreign traffic. At first glance it might
be suspected that this departure from our normal^
protectionist attitude would succeed only in further de-
pressing the American shipbuilder; as a matter of fact
the rate structure for Panama Canal clearance opened the
way for another of the cost-reducing aids. Under the
terms of this act, an American operator might acquire a
cheaper foreign vessel, operate it on a trans-isthmian
route, and still have it registered under the American
flag, giving himself thereby a substantial saving in
canal tolls. Needless to say, the opening of the Canal
on August 15, 1914 effectively eliminated the Cape Horn
passage for world trade.
The Act was amended on August 18, 1914 to allow
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American operators to register foreign-built vessels of
any age. There is no question that this did tend to
depress. American shiobuilding . Cost of construction ex-
ceeded that of European shipyards by as much as fifty per
cent.
Another provision of this Act forbade the passage of
any "company-owned” steamships through the Canal. This
effectively curtailed the railroads in their threats to
operate subsidiary steamship companies to avoid the loss
of revenues which the opening of the Canal would otherwise
mean.
The Act of 1912, and the Act of 1914 amendatory
thereto, must be appraised from the standpoint of progress
rather than of true and final accomplishment. Although
traffic on American ships did increase, it is difficult
to separate the achievements of the Acts from those ad-
duceable to the World War, which enabled us as the leading
neutral to establish the same kind of artificial position
which we had enjoyed during the War of 1812.
We must turn, then to the First World War as another
factor in our maritime history. This is not deprecatory
of the spirit behind the Panama Canal Acts, for which a
prostrate maritime indtstry was duly grateful, but simply
to approach as rapidly as possible the formative period
of today's merchant marine, and to attempt to analyze, on
the basis of the legislation of the past thirty years,
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the true significance of a government's friendliness
toward our shipping. We must not forget either the con-
stant and growing tendency of foreign countries to help
their marine industries; Cunard, made a baronet in 1859
for his devotion to the cause of an ocean-going England,
was only one of many European entrepreneurs who have
never dispatched a voyage without a portion of their
.
country's funds safely paid in hand.
The outbreak of hostilities in Europe in 1914 shocked
us into the realization that the feeble efforts made to
this time towards the fostering of a merchant marine had
been ineffective. Motives of caution and necessity
diverted practically all foreign vessels into their own
waters. As the leading neutral and the provider for many
of the world’s needs, we faced growing surpluses of com-
modities, saw eager foreign markets for them all, and
realized simultaneously the inadequacy of our shipping to
haul them. The Shipping Act of September 7> 1916 was
born as much of economic necessity as of an ideological
desire to be the "allied lifeline;" no important faction,
sectional or otherwise, opposed its passage.
This Act created the United States Shipping Board,
which wax to continue as the guiding organization of our
marine commerce until 1936. It was empowered by the Act
to do all within its power to encourage the development
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of an American merchant marine, and in the words of the
Act, was created
"for the purpose of encouraging, developing,
and creating a naval auxiliary and naval
reserve and a merchant marine to meet the
requirements of the Commerce of the United
States with its territories and possessions
and with foreign countries; to regulate
carriers by water engaged in the foreign and
interstate commerce of the United States, ^
and for other purposes "
The Board was authorized to campare at all times the
progress of other nations with that of the United States,
and to regulate strictly the foreign ownership of American-
built vessels. This latter provision was consistent with
our relaxing of restrictions under the Fanama Canal Acts,
which, lest American vessels be diverted into foreign
registry, actually allowed foreign vessels to come into
our citizens' hands.
The most important single provision of the Act,
however, and that which would have produced the most
forthright results had it not keen for our ultimate
participation in the conflict, was the clause which gave
to the Board the power to organize one or more corporations
for the maintenance and operation of a merchant fleet.
^
Under this provision, on April 16
,
1917
*
the Emergency
12American Shipping Bureau, op. cit., p. 9.
13lbid., p. 10.
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>Fleet Corporation was organized under the laws of the
District of Columbia, capitalized with the full grant of
$50,000,000 which Congress had allowed in the Act for that
purpose, and proceeded immediately to let purchase contract
to shipwrights, and then to operate the vessels in the
carriage of troops and materiel to foreign shores.
Necessarily, in an operation so quickly implemented,
and subject as are most such organizations to government
inefficiency and political waste, the long-run commercial
aspects of the problem were neglected. Never had American
crews complained so bitterly of American-built steamships,
and with apparent good reason. They were constructed of
any material which a hard-pressed Navy Department would
approve: steel, iron, wood, and even concrete. Their
inefficiency is already a matter of legend, but they
served the purpose. It was hardly within the province
of a war-harassed government to stipulate that the usual
20-year expected life of a steamer be a condition for its
building. The most important matter was to help the
Allied cause, and the means to that end were rightfully
considered to be less important.
Necessity strangled at birth the possible beneficent
allowances of the Act, and diverted its powers into the
war machine. The notorious Hog Islander, the 1918 counter-
part of the Liberty Ship, though it spewed its rivets into
the Atlantic current and was disastrously short-lived,
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answered an Immediate purpose which should truly have been
given precedence over any long-run concern for our com-
mercial future. With regard to merchant marine administral
tion, however, the Act of 1916 points out one element of
our national philosophy which was to plague us even until
December 7, 1941. Ours was a rich economy, born of
tremendous resources and a highly skilled and undrainable
labor market; it was nevertheless often a case of "too
little and too late." Only the tremendous quantity of
vessels—more than twenty-five hundred of them—redeemed
their inherent weaknesses. When one was out of commission,
there were two more to take its place. At this time,
therefore, our maritime policy was geared to national
necessity; far better to give Pershing what he needed than
to make long-range plans for the merchant marine of the
future !
The Act was intended to furnish honest and forthright
aid to the shipping industry. As a peacetime effective
help, it was never properly tested, since the Act of 1920
aupplanted it before its true effectiveness could be
measured under peacetime conditions. However, evidence
of the insufficiency of the original $ 50
,
000,000 ap-
propriation, grandiose as it had seemed at the time of
the Act’s passage, lies in the increase which took place
in this fund; it was increased first to $750
,
000
,
000
,
and
finally to $2,884,000,000 before the war's end, so costly
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»was the transportation problem with which a militant
America found itself confronted.
War had furnished major dislocations, which must
necessarily have made themselves felt in the shipping
industry as in every other province of our economy. Al-
though our regular steamship lines played a noble part
in the transporting of troops and materiel to the war
fronts, our marine did not become overnight the world
power for thich the authors of the Act apparently hoped.
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Chapter IV
Faced with the readjustments of the post-war era, the
government found most of its previous legislation inadequate
to cope with the maritime problem. Consequently on June 5 >
1920 the Congress passed the Merchant Marine Act of 1920,
commonly referred to as the Jones Act.-1- This act had
several provisions designed specifically for the fostering
of our private marine industry through government inter-
vention and help.
The powers of the Shipping Board were extended to allow
it to dispose of the tremendous fleet which wartime exigencies
had produced. Although many of the ships, as has been in-
dicated above, fell far below usual operating standards, the
bulk of the fleet was adaptable to an overhauling which
would equip it for commercial service. A comparable function,
it should be noted, was conferred upon the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation after the recent war, with respect to
so-called surplus equipment.
Thus was the immediate purpose of the government to be
served. It was the owner of a wartime fleet to which it
could not possibly dedicate the requisite time and effort,
and was faced as well with public reluctance for a government
Bogart, E. L., & Kemmerer, D. L. op. cit., p, 722.
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to compete In too forthright a manner with private Industry,
especially an industry standing so poorly in a competitive
world market.
The purposes of the legislation may be cited to in-
dicate the nature of the approach; some of the most important
duties of the Board were:
"To investigate and determine what steamship lines
lines should be extablished and operated between
the United States and foreign ports for the develop-
ment and maintenance of the foreign and coastwise
trade of the United States and an adequate postal
service; to sell vessels under its control to res-
ponsible citizens of the United States who will
agree to maintain such lines under terms as the
Board may deem advisable.
"To cooperate with the Secretary of War in encour-
aging the development of ports and transportation
facilities in connection with the water commerce
over which the Board has jurisdiction.
"To recondition and keep in suitable repair and
operate, until sold, all vessels under its con-
trol either directly or through the United States 2Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation "
Membership of the Board was increased from five men to
seven, due to the expected additional administrative work.
In addition to the duties prescribed by the selling provision
the Board was required to assist the operators in maintaining
a merchant fleet consistent with the Board's standards.
Assistance was to be rendered first from the Construc-
tion Loan Fund, which was set up by Congressional appropria-
2
American Shipping Bureau. op. cit., p. 11.
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tion, wnd was to furnish capital which could be lent to oper-
ators interested in modernizing existing vessels or in
building new ones, the proviso being that at least 50% of
the amount must be furnished by private capital. At
moderate rates of interest, in many cases as low as three
and one-half per cent per annum, the Board was authorized
to lend the remaining fifty per cent, repayable in annual
instalments over a period not to exceed twenty years. Under
the terms of this fund, fifteen new vessels were built for
existing steamship companies by American shipbuilders, for
a total of 106,478 gross tons; the government lent the sum
of $18,629,500, representing approximately fifty per cent
of the total construction cost, to the various companies,
among them the American Line, the Coamo Steamship Corporation
•5
and Eastern Steamship Lines, Inc.
It was apparent that private capital still did not
possess sufficient incentive to risk itself in the unfauor-
able trans-oceanic traffic. The Construction Loan Fund
amounted to $125)000,000. Since only $18,000,000 was em-
ployed at this time, it is obvious that enterprisers did
not yet believe it worthwhile to take advantage of the loan
facilities made available to them.
^American Shipping Bureau, op. cit., p. 15.
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However, it is not oar purpose here to cavil at the
failure of the Act to accomplish its worthy purpose, but
rather to indicate the new trends of thinking being em-
ployed, and the new awareness of the sad state of our
maritime commerce.
By authority of the Act, all foreign ships under tem-
porary American registry as of February 1, 1920, were
allowed to remain as American flag carriers, a provision
which gave a competitive benefit to those operators who
had acquired foreign vessels at lower costs, and by
allowance of the wartime emergency laws had been allowed
to document them as American ships. The coastwise laws
were extended to give benefit to domestic companies by
expanding the American shipping monopoly to ”all island
4
territories,” which now included Guam and American Samoa.
We see that the Board was now given considerable
benevolent authority over our transoceanic shipping. It
was authorized and empowered to determine what steamship
routes would best serve the public convenience and necessity,
and by means of favorable selling prices on surplus vessels,
to implement these routes for their operators or prospective
operators. Decision must be made first that a route was
valuable to our economy, after which, by means of its powers,
4
Ibid., p. 11.
r,
'
[ ;
. i .
f to u q xrtC'tov eJ ii; i inooof o i JoA sdJ 'I "Jlivl
~ne
,< o 1 : ;»• j; 1 to n* r: • ; .
I
1 .'- ;i * ? -i ;' t • .o
•it t . Id .G X l 11 60 " • •.?••:
wo
•re p. 1 1 v' ' : ' no • ' • : - o - •.
•
' J i / • j. .
•
,
'
”
«
. .1 '•
.
•
•
! ’
' i
'
:
'
'
r
‘ '
) ;
*
:.
. V • 1 > '
'
\ tisq *ievo ^IrtodJua >h
i . . ; • i
'
.
v ' • v*o i :• r:i tf f 9
J
’
X 1 3 • . 10 j Of-}
Olo t :c s
; • J > ?.
. . .
the Board was expected to take such steps as might be
necessary within its jurisdiction to make a place for that
route in our maritime scheme of things.
Recommendations were to be made to the Secretary of
War when the Board believed that port and terminal facilities
were inadequate for a self-supporting traffic flow, on the
very reasonable theory that Quartermaster operations during
a war might be hampered by the very difficulties which had
beset merchant shippers. It was in this kind of advisory
capacity that the Board best served its purposes; public
funds could effectively be diverted into the avenues where
they were most needed.
The Emergency Fleet of surplus merchant vessels was to
be maintained in proper condition, and operated for the
account of the Board until scrapped or said. Most of the
wooden vessels and all of the concrete were scrapped within
eighteen months of the passage of the Act, with virtually
no salvage value, but over ninety per dent of the steel
vessels were sold to private companies, at an average price
of ten percent of the original cost.^ Only at such bargain
rates could capital be induced to risk the difficulties of
such a highly competitive market as ocean-going steam
operation.
5Glover, j . G., & Cornell, W. B. op. cit., p. 722.
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Section 28 of the Act allowed for preferential rail
rates for goods or passengers connecting with American
shipping lines, provided suitable voucher was made that
such connection was actually contemplated. It is unfor-
tunate that this provision should have been implemented
during a period when the railroads were faced with no
special incentives toward rate-cutting; for the most part
this provision remained inoperative.
As to outright payments and grants, the original scope
of the Act was ideally suited to subsidization on a most
practical scale. All mails so far as practicable were to
be carried by American rather than foreign steamers. The
Shipping Board, through the Postmaster General, was em-
powered to establish "fair and reasonable" rates for mail
carriage, and to enter into contracts within the limits of
Congressional appropriation. It was this last which proved
the mail plan’s undoing. An economy-minded Congress, six
months later, before a single contract had been signed,
stipulated in the appropriation for 1921 and thereafter
that no contract should be of more than one year’s duration;
that, furthermore, the rates should be subject to review at
termination of each such contract.
No blame can be attached to American shippers for
failing to establish or expand facilities on the basis of
a 365-day commitment. The amounts of capital required for
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effective competition with foreign companies, and even for
fulfillment of the joint requirements of the Shipping Board
and the Postmaster General, were too great for so short-
lived a guarantee of return.
In its efforts to maintain and operate the unsold
portions of the fleet until final arrangements were made
for each vessel, the Shipping Board sustained a public
loss in the fiscal year 1921 of over $ 50
,
000
,
000
,
hardly,
it must be admitted, an incentive to Congress to expand
its facilities. 6
From the vantage point of hindsight, it is possible
for us to inspect the weaknesses of this legislation, but
its contemporaries had no such opportunity for analysis.
That it was ineffective, clumsy and poorly integrated is
apparent: from 1924 to 1929 only $4,801,953 was paid in
7
mail subsidies to six companies. But we must remember
that it was basically an emergency measure, and moreover
that it possessed all the usual weaknesses of new and
unprecedented lawmaking.
Our present maritime policy truly dates from 1936,
but before this date there was another act, superior to
the Act of 1920 in its more realistic generosity, but still
6Clark, William H. op. cit., p. 313.
^American Shipping Bureau, op. cit., p. 17.
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fumbling in its efforts to help a struggling shipping
industry. By 1928, our marine was in sorry condition.
Many of the smaller companies, unable to compete with
heavily subsidized foreign concerns, were forced to close
their doors entirely, and this during the prosperous decade
of the 1920's. Although the major shipping companies,
especially those receiving even the fragmentary aid pro-
vided by the Act of 1920, managed occasionally even to pay
dividends, by and large the industry was in distress. The
Act of 1928 was Congress' new answer.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1928, passed on May 22, 1928
was co-authored by the sponsor of the Act of 1920, and is
known as the Jones-White Merchant Marine Act. This piece
of legislation was occasioned primarily by the growing
obsolescence of American steamers, and a realization that
the expected useful life of the American merchant fleet
was shrinking to an alarmingly low f igure. J Competition
on the basis of quality, especially in passenger traffic,
was almost impossible; British and German steamers,
especially were carrying the premium traffic, leaving an
insignificant balance for American ships. Cargo as well
was more and more finding its way into foreign holds;
Q
Glover, J. G., & Cornell, W. B. op. cit., p. 637 .
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necessarily a merchant faced with the changing complexion
of a foreign market was interested primarily in speed and
reliability. Public pressure and the concerted efforts of
the shipping groups resulted in the passage of the new act,
which embodied many of the principles of the old, but ex-
panded them and made them more adaptable to current needs.
Under its provisions, mail contracts could be awarded
for a period of ten years, Drovided either new shipbuilding
or modernization of old ships by the applying company
brought operations up to the standard demanded by the Board
in applying its new and higher rates, which varied with
different routes, and were applied largely on the basis
of the differential needed to cover costs so that American
freight rates and passenger fares could be dropped to
9
compete with foreign countries' shipping. A ten-year con-
tract would furnish an incentive to such shipbuilding and
overhauling, where a one-year contract was falling far
short of the mark.
To enable shipping companies to arrange for such
building without impairing already weak working capital,
the Construction Loan Fund was increased to $250,000,000,
and only twenty-five per cent of the cost need be met by
9
Ibid., p. 637.
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private capital, with the Board furnishing the remaining
seventy-five per cent, at rates of interest which varied
from three and one-half per cent for vessels slated for
foreign service to five and one-quarter per cent for ships
for the coastwise trade. 10As a result of the stimulus fur-
nished by these more liberal facilities, thirty-one first
line passenger and cargo combination ships, nine tankers,
and two sea-trains were built, and a total of forty exis-
ting vessels reconditioned. The inherent weakness in the
loan policy was that too little emphasis was placed upon
the ordinary freighter; consequently, ships designed es-
pecially for cargo were still too few, and much American
ocean freight still sailed in foreign bottoms.
^
Mail aid was more generous than it had ever been in the
history of the country. Commitments for $300,000,000 were
signed by the Shipping Board and the Postmaster General
with American and foreign companies, on ten year contracts
paying annual totals of $30,000,000. The fact that certain
of these subsidies actually were awarded to foreign companies
is a clear indication that American shipbuilding capital
was still not free enough to serve the purpose.
^American Shipping Bureau, op. cit., p. 13.
^Glover, J. G., & Cornell, W. B. op. cit., p. 638 .
l^Among these were Cunard; Compagnie General Trarsatlantique
,
Hamburg-American; White Star; North German Lloyd; Swedish
American Line, etc. American Shipping Bureau, op. cit. p. 26.
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The Act embodied in its text a reaffirmation of the
purposes of the Act of 1920; activities were to be predica-
ted upon the assumption that a strong merchant marine was
indispensable to the welfare of the nation, and that the
government was obliged to bolster its strength in the most
practical, economical, and realistic manner. Such is the
stuff of which all recent maritime legislation has been
compounded; motive and purpose cannot be impugned. It is
only concerning methods that argument can be raised.
The Construction Loan Fund, in particular, seemed to
be essential. Largely as a result of the new liberality
displayed in policies of ship mortgaging under the 1928 law,
by January 1, 1932, our marine comprised six hundred vessels
of over 3,500,000, gross tons,"^a respectable nucleus for a
fleet. In all, fifty-seven vessels were constructed within
the limitations of the Board’s high standards, and forty
14
more were reconditioned. Of the more than $300,000,000
which was thereby spent, approximately eighty per cent was
paid to laboring groups, either directly to shipbuilding
companies, or indirectly as a result of purchases made
otherwise to implement ocean-going operation. Since loans
could be made for as much as seventy-five per cent of cost,
and repaid over a period of twenty years, it had now become
^American Shipping Bureau, op. cit., p. 7.
14Ibid.
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.more within the realm of possibility that capital be risked
in the shipping business, especially when mail contracts
with a long life term were offered as the final reward.
Even so, as was noted above, capital was only free compared
with previous years; on an absolute basis, it still did not
suffice for complete accomplishment.
The Loan Fund furnished to sixteen steamship companies
the sum of $116,183,237.40 for new construction of forty-two^
vessels of 458,084 gross tons, among them such vessels as
the Manhattan and the Washington for United States Lines,
each of 25,000 tons; the Mariposa , the Monterey , and the
Lurline . each of 18,000 tons, for the Oceanic Steamship
Company; the Santa Rosa and the Santa Paula , each of 11,000
tons, for the Panama Mail Steamship Company, one of the oldest
shipping concerns in the United States; the Morro Castle
and the Qriente . each of 11,000 tons, for the Atlantic Gulf
and West Indian Steamship Lines; the President Hoover and
the President Coolidge . each of 22,000 tons, for the Dollar
Steamship Lines.^ The cost of such vessels as these, and
even of the smaller ships built under the terms of the Act,
would have been prohibitive for an unsubsidized and unaided
industry. These ships, small in number though they still
1
^Fifteen vessels were built under 1920 terms, making 57 in ill
^American Shipping Bureau, op. cit., p. 15.
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were, represented accomplishment of a positive nature when
we consider the disastrously inefficient marine which we
possessed just before World War I, seventy years after
Great Britain, for example, had become a first-class steam-
operating ocean power.
In addition, $12,922,057*26 was lent to companies to
overhaul and modernize forty vessels, of 269,155 gross tons,
which had previously been in operation, but were of insuf-
ficient sixe, speed, carrying capacity or efficienty to
conform with the rules set down by the Board for the
17
awarding of mail contracts.
The mail contracts themselves were more generous than
any previous such instruments. As Figure 3 indicates, the
true cost of subsidization must be the difference between
contract award and the actual poundage cost which would have
to be paid by any shipper of a similar commodity. The net
Fiscal Contract Poundage Net
Year Award Hate Cost
1929 $ 9,304,217.82 $1,685,159.97 $ 7
,
619
,
057.85
1930 13,066,440.87 2,272,730.44 10,793,710.43
1931 18,818,039.76 2,710,645.82 16
,
107
,
393.94
1932 22,431,791*04 3,267,453.33 19,164,337.71. 18
Figure 3. Net Costs of Maintaining Service under Mail Pay
Provisions of Merchant Marine Act of 1928.
is the true subsidy, and is of course somewhat lower than
^American Shipping Bureau, op. cit., p. 15.
i ft
^American Shipping Bureau. Tabulation from report of
Postmaster General, 1932*
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the contract figure. Still, a government commitment of
$300
,
000,000 over a period of ten years was definitely of
major importance as it was an indicator of future policies.
Two other provisions of the Act must also be mentioned.
All government personnel were required to travel on govern-
ment business by American steamship routes and on vessels
flying the American flag. While this seems to belabor what
should have been the obvious, the luxurious accomodations
offered by foreign carriers had on many occasions tempted
even our diplomatic and military personnel away from our
ships. ^No more trenchant commentary can be made as to our
sad position in the maritime world than that we must by
edict insist that our government employees use our own
vessels in their business travels.
The place of the merchant marine in national defense
also came under consideration in the Act of 1928. Specific
provision was made that in time of national emergency, as
determined by presidential proclamation, the Board be
authorized to seize any ship on which an outstanding loan
balance was due, or which was receiving government payments
under a mail contract, paying a "fair and reasonable" value
to the owner, and to deliver such ship to the Armed Services
or to operate it on their behalf for troop carriage or
^American Shipping Bureau, op. cit., p. 14.
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20
materiel transport. Thus did the act take cognizance of
the importance of a merchant marine in our national
security.
It is difficult, as it was with many of the other
legislative instruments, to appraise cor. pletely the results
of this Act. In the first place, it had been operative fof
only two years when all of our industries were stricken
by a world depression, which caused our foreign trade to
21drop drastically. Secondly, the executive machingry under
the Act was not well enough integrated to prevent the
carfeless administration of certain of the funds, a condition
which we shall examine at length in the succeeding chapter.
And thirdly, we were forced by circumstances to make awards
of certain of the mail contracts to foreign carriers.
Therefore we cannot truly state that all of the funds
were directed where they could be most fruitful, and
reluctantly concession must here be made that this Act, too,
represented incomplete aid.
In the meantime, European governments were active in
their espousal of commercial causes. The German government
had eight of its representatives appointed to the twenty-
eight man Board of Directors of the merged Hamburg-American
20American Shipping Eureau, op. cit., p. 14.
21
Ibid., p. 14.
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and North German Lloyd Company, and has in addition set
aside the equivalent of $3,000,000 to subsidize the scrap-
ping of certain overage vessels. The French government
aided in the refinancing of the Compagnie General Trans-
atlantiaue by public offering of the securities of that
company in 1931*
Italy began in 1932 to pay outright subsidies to cargo
vessels in addition to the amounts which it had been settin
aside for years for extra mail contracts, and loaned the
sum of $15,600,000 for construction of the Hex and the
Conte di Savoia, paying as well a portion of the insurance
premiums on these: vessels. This is the kind of aid which
European governments apparently think is worthwhile, in
addition to their traditional and generous subsidies for
po
the carriage of international mail.
In the words of the Honorable Daniel C. Eoper, Secre-
tary of Commerce;
"Perhaps the outstanding weakness of the Act was
its failure to bring about a sufficient number
of replacements to modernize a fleet which has
become so obsolete that without generous sub-
sidies it can no longer compete in international^
trade °
;
22
The entire discussion here of foreign efforts is taken
from the American Shipping Bureau’s "The American Merchant
Marine," p. 140-143.
23
"Our Merchant Marine To Be." in the Scientific American
for October, 1936. p. 208-211.
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Intervening between the Act of 1928 and the Act of
1936, which marked the beginning of our present policies
came only the Economy Act of 1932, whose sole provision
relating to the Merchant Marine was to reduce the member-
ship of the Shipping Board from five to three men. Its
primary result was the placing of an additional adminis-
trative burden upon the survining members, to which eight
be attributed at least a portion of the policy failure.
)
Chapter V
By far the most significant single piece of legis-
lation which the Congress has ever enacted for the fur-
therance of our foreign shipping was the Merchant Marine
Act of 1936,
1
which superseded all other such legislation,
and gave to the government through the United States
Maritime Commission, successor to the Shipping Board, the
wherewithal to accomplish what for so many decades had
been of paramount importance, but had never successfully
been implemented. The sweeping authorities granted by the
law are best illustrated by a quotation from its purposes}
*'To further the development and maintenance of
an adequate and well-balanced American merchant
marine, to promote the commerce of the United
States, to aid in the nationalldef ense
,
to re-
peal certain former legislation, and for other
purposes .
"
One of the first and most important steps taken by
the Commission under its authority was the outright repeal
of the mail contracts, which admittedly had for many years
been a superficial approach to aid. Negotiations were
begun immediately with all steamship companies which held
contracts under the provisions of the Act of 1928 for the
immediate cancellation of such agreements; by June 30, 1937
1
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largely due to the negotiating ability of Joseph P.
Kennedy, first Chairman of the Commission, all such con-
tracts, totalling $73)000*000, were cancelled at a cost to
the government of only $750, 000. 2 In place of the mail
contract provision, which admittedly allowed certain
diversion of funds, and occasionally even the lining of
private pockets (see below), there were substituted two
other kinds of subsidy; payments of portions of the cost
for new ocean-going vessels, and loans for most of the
balance; and outright payments to companies operating
routes to foreign markets. In exchange for these more
generous and core effective payments, the Commission was
to supervise operations very closely, and to require the
filing of periodic financial information. A close grip
on the purse strings was one of the characteristics which
was to distinguish the Maritime Commission from its pre-
descessors.
Before attempting to appraise exhaustively the results
of the new Act, a brief survey of its first accomplishments
might be made. One of its first duties was to make a com-
plete examination of the actual status of our marine, and
to determine exactly what needed to be done. This survey
indicated that by 1942 over ninety per cent of all our
2Special Eeport on the Merchant Marine. Fortune Magazine,
September, 1937. p. 57.
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merchant vessels would be overage, according to the standard
of quality which the Commission was to demand for sub-
sidized operation. Recommendation was made, consequently,
that a well-directed effort be made to huild a t least
fifty first-line ships per year for ten years. The onset
of the second World War was to accomplish this in spite of
the financial limitations which would otherwise have
curtailed such an ambitious design.
By November 1, 1940, contracts had been signed by
shipping companies with shipbuilder?
,
under Commission
auspices, for one hundred seventy-nine vessels of all
types. Seventy-three had been launched, and fifty-one
were in service, including the superliner America , which
was to make its £id as America's merchant flagship. Sub-
sidies ranging from thirty to forty-five per cent of the
cost were awarded to reduce the differential between costs
of American and foreign construction, and operating sub-
sidies in 1937) 1938, and 1939 were to average approximately
$13,000,000 in each of these years. ^ This was obviously
the kind of concrete aid for which the industry had been
waiting, and spurred by the impetus of the threat of
another European war, we find that the percentage of our
^Fortune Magazine, September, 1937. p. 63 .
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trade moving in American bottoms began to show the in-
crease for which we had hoped. (Appendix A)
Aside from its abilities to subsidize, however, the
Act possessed one further goad to private operators to busy
themselves with establishing their supremacy. Should the
subsidy program fail to provide enough vessels of American
registry, the Commission itself was authorized to build and
operate such vessels, in order to secure the place on the
high seas to which our legislators felt us to be entitled.
For its more specific accomplishments, we must turn
to the background of the Act, where its purposes were born.
It was a mixture of a renewed realization of national
necessity and a senatorial muckraking which the abuses of
the Act of 1928 had brought about.
Briefly, then, we must consider this background.
Senator Hugo Black of Alabama, later to become a Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States, and Senator
Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee, Chairman of the Senate
Post Office Committee, were aroused for some reason to an
awareness of certain irregularities in government settle-
4
rnents with the steamship companies, and instituted a full-
scale investigation, in which they were presently joined by
4 It has apparently never been revealed whether the first
hints came from a disgruntled applicant for a mail con-
tract or from an indiscreet employee of the Shipping Board
offices.
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Postmaster General James A. Farley. It was found as a
result of the investigation that many mail contracts had
been awarded not on the basis of the letter of the law,
but for personal favors received; that operating standards
were not being maintained by the companies receiving
certain of the contracts, and that government aid was
therefore apparently not best implemented by mail pay,
but would be by more strictly controlled measures. As a
result of recommendations made to him, President Roosevelt
in March, 1935? asked the Congress for legislation designed
to circumvent the evils inherent in the loosely-knit
organization of the Shipping Board, which he had already
transferred to the jurisdiction of the Department of
Commerce, probably for closer watching.
This is not to cast any aspersions upon the men who
comprised the greater part of Shipping Board membership
through these years, nor to impugn the Post Office depart-
ment. The Board, as has been noted above, was reduced in
size by the Economy Act of 1932, and apparently quite
legitimately had lost touch with certain of the important
details necessary to proper administration of post-office
contracts. The unpopularity of mail subsidies, however,
does undoubtedly stem from the 1935 investigations, which
Fortune Magazine, September, 1937. p. 76-77.
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were thoroughly aired, and received considerable public
attention.
After considerable Congressional debate, marked £y
the introduction of the powerfully supported Bland-
Copeland Bill, a Mno-strings-attached H subsidy bill, and
the Guffey Bill, which called for government control and
close supervision, the Congress finally passed the latter,
with minor revisions, as the Merchant Marine Act of 193°*
The provisions of the Act may be divided roughly into
two sections. First, the United States Maritime Commis-
sion may absorb all of the power of previous agencies, and
becomes the sole authority in maritime matters; a
necessary concomitant is the virtual cancellation of all
existing maritime laws, a wiping of the slate, so to speak
so that a fresh and unsullied start could be made. Funds
were to be provided by Congressional appropriation, on
the recommendation of the Commission, and were to be used
within its discretion for the building and operating sub-
sidies the administering of which became one of its most
important functions.
The second section of the Act represents a legalistic
triumph in that it effectively closes all loopholes in the
administration of maritime policy, spelling out in complet
detail precisely how each dollar of subsidy shall be applied
and under what conditions.
^
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For receipt of any federal money, a ship operator
must first plan a foreign operation, and submit to the
Commission proof of its ability to conduct such a service
as it contemplated. The Commission must be satisfied that
such a route serves the public convenience, and will then
pass along plans for the vessel or vessels to the Navy
Department , which decides whether such a ship can be adapted
to use in wartime as an auxiliary. If all approvals are
secured, bids are requested from shipbuilding companies,
and the low bidder is allowed to proceed.
It is at this point that the Commission exercises its
first arbitrary function. It must decide, through what-
ever evidence it has available, what the foreign cost of
the same kind of vessel would be, and will then pay the
differential directly to the builder. This differential
is not ordinarily to exceed one third of the cost of the
ship, but in certain cases may fee as high as fifty per
cent. The operator is required to pay at least one fourth
of the cost in cash, v again directly to the builder, and
the government, through the Commission and its appropriation,
will lend the balance, repayable with interest at three and
one half per cent per annum? over a twenty-year period.
^"Subsidy or Mortgage?” Literary Digest . July 4, 1936. p, 7.
?Bogart, EL, & Kemmerer, D. L. op. cit., p. 722.
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Thus effectively the Commission, if satisfied that all of
its requirements are met, will subsidize the owner of the
vessel to the extent of the full differntial between foreign
and American building costs, will lend a substantial portion
of the balance, and will in addition pay outright and en-
tirely for any special fittings, such as gun-mounts and
anti-submarine devices which the Navy Department has pre-
scribed, and for which presumably the operator would other-
wise have no use.
The administrative provisions were written clearly f©r
for all prospective candidates to see. Vessels built under
the construction subsidy must be maintained in foreign
service. If they were removed from that service, or left
inoperative, a pro-rata portion of the subsidized part of the
cost would have to be returned to the Commission within a
reasonable period. Furthermore, all funds would be paid
directly to the shipbuilder, who was limited to a ten per
cent profit on such a contract, with the requirement that
he return any excess to the Commission, and that he keep
his books and records available for such inspection as the
Commission might require. Further, no salaries in excess
of $25,000 per year were chargeable to such contracts. The
specific nature of this kind of provision was, of course,
entirely lacking in all previous maritime legislation.
ml ith
t
i a 1
5
[
' ij usott* •< bos
& i£- l!: .i > V' ol.tr 1>: t !“. ’••
. >nr -c; -r f
bus bj irr
e
sgnU^ l< , . ;r xol v f*n : i
>. t •>'-•. " I'.
. £j ye-1 .1 u>
«to iIjjc
. c or
..£;oi 'ivoiq iv K. i •• Uii jfcj. riX
. 0 J > j . •) • '
. > i. i i
.
aniB^nisa oc .tcu i ^61 ictee noiioi/'r.'tsncD srt$
-
->
>
'• \"£ ' 0 ': > "
.
>0 : v • .
X f O i •/;• • £Ji freoo
.
; r ^ > ill o
. r : r r T
?
1
v ; ' >1.’ 0-- > ’ >r t
" J i . J *x5 :•• ». ^ in r. , '
an ri $ $ U- c .riotr? :• \i oi ojvjd ; rti i :i
-;s. :iOd^ 09ta.nl riouc io . i -v? ' • a >or. s 2 ri
, ..
•>
;
.
•
'
'
.
V8 1
Other provisions of this construction subsidy plan, not
especially germane to our study, such as the privilege of
trade-in and the exercise of such options by coastwise
operators, served to round out fully its adaptability to a
reasonably complete solution of the cost-differential
problem, which had plagued operators for so mapy years.
Operating subsidies as well are granted under the terms
of the Act, but are not concealed in the guise of mail pay-
ments. Certain specific operating costs, such as insurance
and wages, are measured against the same costs for foreign
companies, and if the Commission decides that a fair estimate
has been made, it will pay an operating subsidy of the dif-
ference between American operating costs and foreign
operating costs in these specific respects, and will make
such payments upon the receipt of vouchered and audited
proof by the company that such costs have been incurred.
What this accomplishes, of course, is to open the financial
structure of the company to the scrutiny of the Commission,
thereby eliminating most of the possibilities of diversion
of funds. Strict rules as to the corporate structure and
affiliations of the companies are enforceable insofar as
the entire financial background and operating technique of
the companies comes under the watchful eye of the Commission.
A further provision stipulates that one half of all
profits ih excess of ten percent must be returned to the
Commission, as a refund on an operation which apparently had
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been too heavily subsidized.
After considerable and literal treatment of such tech-
nical requirements as the depreciation and contingency
reserves of subsidized companies, under Title VII the Act
shows its true earnestness in its hope of establishing an
effective merchant marine. Title VII states in effect that
should enough operations not be instituted as a result of
the inducements otherwise offered, the Commission is
authorized to buy, own, and operate its own ships, effec-
tively thereby using the threat of a government-financed
competition as a further incentive to the operators to do
the job themselves.
It is difficult baldly to attempt to appraise the
results of the Act of 1936. Much of the Commission’s work
was still in the planning and investigating stage when the
war in 1939 introduced a variable which makes its later
work unable to be isolated for analysis. To questions as
to how much of the progress of the late thirties and early
forties was attributable to Commission activity and how
much to forces of foreign markets, neutrality considerations,
and a new and more venturesome capital, we can give no
definitive answer. Certainly it would appear that the Act
was designed to be the kind of aid which would have induced
operators to expand their route structure, even had the
war not appeared to inflate profits and serve as incentive
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>to development. We can see, moreover, from the brief
summary of the results of its work outlined above, that to
the Commission must go a considerable portion of the credit
for rejuvenation of our maritime consciousness.
The provisions of the Act are especially difficult of
appraisal when we remember that during 1940 and 1941 our
attitude toward the belligerents resulted in the outright
sale or gift of many of our overage vessels to England for
use in its prosecution of the war. While the tonnage
figures would therefore show a relative drop during these
years, the general quality of our fleet was improved by
raising the average age of the first line ships in operation
Besides this, the armed services as early as June, 1941
had requisitioned under the presidential authority every
passenger vessel of the United States Lines, most of the
new ships built for Moore-McCormack's "Good Neighbor" fleet,
two of the finest of the President series of the Dollar Line
and many others of smaller tonnage, for use in troop move-
ments to American outposts, and for transport of materiel
to maintain those troops. In September of 1939 > after the
Act of 1936 had been operative for only three years, our
total merchant fleet amounted to 8,176,000 tons; its reduction
to 5,500,000 tons in June, 1941 can hardly be attributed to
any shortcomings of the legislation.
We must necessarily pass over the second World War as
an element of a subsidy program, since the national
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emergency completely ruled out any considerations of mari-
time accomplishments for their own sake. The yeoman job
which was done by our merchant marine as it became part of
our offensive mechanism is already history. As the supreme
mover and hauler of all that the fighting forces needed, its
place should stand unchallenged. Thus by the very nature of
its activity, and the premium put upon its fulfillment of
national duty, spares us the task of sifting from that duty
the elements of accomplishment which might possibly be
integrated into a study of finances and subsidy payments.
Therefore it is to present tendencies and to more
current problems that we address ourselves. During the
immediate post-war period, under policies ordained in prior
years by the Commission, the merchant marine again became
a series of operating companies rather than an integrated
wartime unit, served admirably in the transporting of goods
to a war-ravished Europe and a famine-ridden Asia. As to
subsidies in particular, however, we must again consider the
problem with regard to maritime activities of the past
eighteen months, when the shipping companies have again
begun to feel the pinch of a revived and cost-favored com-
petition.
As indicated by Figure 4, during the war years the
American merchant fleet carried an increasingly large per-
centage of a foreign trade which was materially swelled by
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offensive necessities. It was not until earnings statements
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Figure 4. Percentage of American Foreign
Trade Carried in American Ships.
„
1937-1947, Annual Intervals.
for the first periods of 1948 were reported to the Commission
that concern began to be expressed again. Post-war induce-
ments to other and more profitable investments, even with the
still strong cooperation offered by the government in the
form of subsidies, tended to attract American investors into
other fields, and the cheaper transportation furnished to
shippers by foreign companies returned as a factor to be
coped with. United States Lines, with a drop in net income
for the six months’ period ended June 30, 1948 to thirty
^Business Week
.
August 7, 1948, p. 82.
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nine cents per common share, as compared with $3*59 for the
same period in 1947; American Export Lines, with a drop from
$1.06 per share to 450 per share for the same period; and
Atlantic Gulf and West Indies Steamship Lines, with a drop
from $1.63 per share to a 520 deficit, were typical of a
9
general softening experienced throughout the industry.
Congress had not been remiss in its duties; subsidy
levels in appropriation bills were still high. For the
fiscal year beginning Ju$y 1, 1948, Congress voted a
$94,000,000 fund for the Commission’s building purposes,
and extended the time for use of the 1947 balance of over
$84,000,000 to September 30, 1948, but there were no
commitments arranged.'1'0 The shipping companies believed
the terms too strict in the light of the increasing risks
born of the rejuvenation of foreign shipping companies,
since the maximum construction allowances of fifty per
cent were simply not being allowed by the Commission, which
adhered to a general average allowance of thirty per cent
of building cost. Therefore, the twelve subsidized companies
operating under Commission contracts were not building new
vessels.
Furthermore, European aid was effectively helping
^ Business Week . August 7, 1948. loc. cit.
10Ibid., p. 83.
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foreign producers to regain their place in their own
markets, and the need for bulk cargoes, especially grains
and coal, was no longer as insistent as it had been, during
1946 and 1947. Fearful of the eventual laying up of their
fleets, many of the smaller cargo ship operators have trans-
ferred the registry of their ships to foreign countries,
especially Panama and Honduras, to escape the high American
\
wage laws and the strict operating standards which our
12
marine registry requires.
Squabbles over the shipping of Economic Cooperation
Administration goods have caused stalemates in certain
cases as well, since the law authorizing the E C A uses
hazy wording in its requirement that fifty per cent of all
such goods move in American vessels if they are available
"at market rates." Cost-favored foreign countries insist
that the market rate should mean the world rate for shipping
the Congress and the Maritime Commission are qqually as
insistent that this should be the admittedly higher
American rate. To the present time the difficulty is not
completely settled; although the goods have moved in
tremendous volume, it seems inevitable that future efforts
at accounting will be marked by policy differences.
It is this last upon which current policies and
12
Ibid., p. 84
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problems are being predicated. Should the E C A use the
most efficient and least expensive means of shipping its
goods, or should it patronize the subsidized American
shippers, whose presence on the commercial scene has been
endorsed by ten years of government payments? This question
simply points out once more that the inability of our
merchant marine to compete with that of foreign countries
is undoubtedly a condition which will always be with us.
We cannot require that our seamen receive minimum pay rates
higher than the crews of foreign vessels, we cannot insist
upon operating standards of safety and performance which
are more costly than those of foreign operators, without
expecting our shipping to be penalized accordingly by its
inability to meet the lower passenger and freight fares of
the ships of other countries. If, then, we want a merchant
marine, and an effective one, which can immediately be
called into play in the event of emergency, and which may
ultimately prevent our exploitation by discriminatory rates,
then it follows automatically that we must nationally
support such an enterprise. Very few American entrepreneurs
have shown any proclivity for inauguaating a business from
patriotic motives alone.
Consequently in 1939) faced with a situation unfortu-
nately comparable to the last war, the Congress and the
Commission have viewed our fleet, in so large part composed
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of Victory ships and Liberty ships, neither of long useful
life, and neither economical to operate, and reiterated
again the policy which has guided our approach for the past
decade and more: regardless of economic arguments for or
against the subsidy, the United States must always have
first line vessels in top operating condition in case of a
national emergency. The one certain way of having them was
to encourage private shippers to build and use them.
Besides the appropriation mentioned above, itself
positive action, the attitude of the Commission has relaxed
enough to encourage operators to build new steamships.
Contracts have been let for five first line passenger-
cargo vessels, three twelve thousand ton ships for the
American President LinesCformerly Dollar Steamship Lines),
subsidized by Commission ruling to the extent of 44.05$
of their $32,000,000 cost, and two twenty thousand ton
ships for the American Export Lines, subsidized to the ex-
tent of 45$ of their $47,000,000 cost. In addition, the
operating subsidy rates have been reviewed, and in certain
cases have provisionally been revised upward.
No new legislation has been passed with regard to
subsidies since the Act of 1936, but each new appropriation
becomes in effect a review of the need for payments. It
is apparent now that the desire for a well-founded merchant
marine is no longer a question of national pride or the
protection of home industry, but has become a part of
y
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national survival. Twice the United States has entered a
World War with insufficient auxiliary shipping; even the
threat of war in this current period seems to be enough
to adjure the Congress that a fleet must be maintained.
Short of operating steamship companies itself, the
Commission must award life-giving subsidies to steamship
companies if it is to fulfill its purposes. Whatever the
advocates of natural competition may feel, this is the
Commission’s responsibility until such time as the law is
revised.
The pressing economic question against subsidies is a
fair ones why should the government pay to help to support
an expensive industry, when shippers are perfectly willing
to use the cheaper foreign services? In other words, why
should we not take advantage of foreign savings, and admit
that our standards are too high for us to become a major
maritime power.
If dollars and cents considerations were the only
problem, such reasoning might seem eminently valid. But
national policies become a problem as well. If our merchant
marine once again begins a downward trend, unchecked it may
not stop until it reaches an effective bottom. We must
apparently have either a suitable fleet or none at all;
half-way measures have proved ineffective for almost a
century. And without a fleet of any kind, it can readily
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be Imagined what would be the plight of the American pro-
ducer, dependent upon foreign markets, should the government
subsidized foreign companies decide to impose discriminatory
rates upon American cargoes to protect their own markets.
Even this, though, is of minor importance. National
defense and our survival in time of war have become a
significant part of our approach to marine policy. The
United States must not find itself without overseas carriers
in another crisis.
This is not to give unqualified support to a subsidy
system. A history which makes an effort to restrain itself
from a partisan approach is not the vehicle for such con-
clusions. However, the exigencies of the twentieth century
have pointed the way to a constructive maritime policy,
of which the subsidy and its administration have become a
powerful instrument. It is true that there have been
serious abuses of the subsidy, but it is equally true that
the avenue to most of these abuses has been blocked by more
careful legislation. It is indeed unlikely that the future
will exhibit any relaxation from this strictness.
Properly administered, it is apparent that the subsidy
is not fundamentally evil, nor is it anachronistic, nor is
it the tool only of the United States. All nations, cost-
favored or not, which have made an effective bid for marine
supremacy have used it, with varying success. Whether we
• < 'Mie'j'so . ; -ion a 'U eJ
t
ri to/i;;
f tl l i
•
.
r
' /
» t©i .. ni
.
-1 - b i Z : ’'I t O 1 O ' 1
,
.
. r
it 1 ; UO I - p.
.
.
'
fCnoUfcn 1IA
.
vi ' 1~> • r a v/w . o.i , .. r ; :o :
*
.
will or no, as a policy-making instrument the subsidy is
here to stay. History alone can appraise its effects upon
the period which we are now entering, and alone can decide
whether the choice of the subsidy was consistent with ouf
national welfare.
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CONCLUSION
It is apparent from our study that it is impossible to
evaluate the ship subsidy program entirely without regard for
other factors; subsidy legislation has too often closely
antedated a war, a depression, or some other severely dis-
locating series of circumstances for us even to attempt to
consider it in an economic or social vacuum.
It is also apparent from our analysis of legislation
designed to help us to compete with subsidy-paying foreign
powers, and from our perusal of the historial elements of
our commercial status, that the subsidy is indispensable to
an effective Merchant Marine, and that from military and
political considerations, as well as from economic, our
maritime position must be ensured by such policies.
With all its limitations, the subsidy remains the most
complete solution yet presented by our lawmakers. We have
found that two majoy factors prevent our shipping companies
from effectively competing for carriage of our products:
first, the cost structure of our shipping industry is the
highest in the world; and second, the subsidy policy of
other nations has widened still further the differential
and gap between American and foreign rates.
If we concede only that our national security warrants
some, national effort toward the maintenance of a competent
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and operative Merchant Fleet, we must then automatically
concede the necessity for concessions by our government to
ensure that such a happy eventuality be sedured.
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Abstract of thesis
With the founding of our Republic, we began an aware-
ness of our maritime status which has been instrumental
during several periods of our history in persuading our
lawmakers to attempt to restore a declining merchant marine
by means of federal subsidy payments. Although our first
Congress was not so hard-pressed as to allow federal pay-
ments for the fostering of the shipping industry, it did
by several methods make it known that the shipping supremacy
of the colonial period should not be sacrificed for other
considerations. With bounties and discriminatory duties,
with tariffs and tonnage allowances, our marine<was protected
from the effects of world-wide competition, and this at a
time when our tradition and our resources made shipping a
natural adjunct to our economy.
After the formative period of our commerce, which ended
at approximately the same time as the Wrar of 1812
,
we
entered an age of shipping when the Yankee sailing vessel
was the carrier of many of the world* s cargoes, when the
American flag was seen in every port, and Congressional
efforts could Justifiably be postponed. The era of the
clipper was indded the "golden age” of our shipping.
So complacent were we in our ascendancy that we neglected
entirely to develop steam engineering, which began profitably
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to be used at this time by other countries. By the time our
efforts were implemented, other nations had far outstripped
us, and our first subsidy act, the Act of 1845, was almost
completely ineffectual in placing American steam shipping on
the high seas. The Act of 1847, largely favoring the ill-
fated Collins Line, was only slightly less abortive, and its
abrogation after the expenditure of great sums of money with
no permanent result, precipitated us into a period of decline
from which only World Wars and new subsidies could raise us.
While other governments became more and more generous
to their shipping companies, paying them millions of dollars
in mail contracts, we enacted the penurious Ocean Mail Act
of 1891, which produced so little result as hardly to be
worthy of note. Only insofar as it indicated a stirring of
the American public toward solution of the problem of a
destitute shipping industry is this legislation important
in our history.
The true awakening, which was to consume so many years
before its culmination in today's realistic approach, began
with the first World War, when a hastily conceived Shipping
Act endeavoured to fill the breech with its Emergency Fleet
Corporation, mother of the war-born, inefficient, and
costly fleet of 1918. Although long-range plans must
necessarily under the circumstances have been relegated to
a secondary position by the exigencies of war, it is apparent
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that here lay the germ of modern legislation, if only as
reflected in the realization of the governments place in
our maritime commerce.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 was our answer to the
postwar problem of fleet transferral and the need for new
subsidies. A normalcy-ridden Congress reduced the effective-
ness of the latter, but the fleet was disposed of at prices
low enough to attract at least small portions of private
capital into the field. Though by no means enough, this
entrance of the entrepreneur, and the slight expansion of
existing route structures, indicated what proper legislation
could accomplish if the Congress would provide it.
Faced with this realization, and aware of the new and
productive efforts consistently being made by foreign
governments, the Congress in 1928 passed a new act, similar
to its predescessor
,
but extending its provisions in such a
manner as actually to accomplish a portion of the result for
which it was drafted. Ships were built, others were repaired,
and although the award of mail contracts was injudicious or
ineffective in some cases, this was more productive lawmaking
than had been done before for the maritime industry.
Modern policy was reflected first in the Merchant Marine
Act of 1936, under which our present policy still operates.
Brought about by administrative difficulties in the Act of
1928, and by a new and aroused national cognizance of the
shipping problem, the Act created the United States Maritime
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Commission, with sleeping powers for the fostering and
regulating of our foreign commerce. Both construction
subsidies and operating subsidies were awarded, and the
opening of the second World War found us, though unprepared,
in much better position than any previous legislation could
possibly have guaranteed. In spite of the dislocations of
the War, it is apparent that the Act was instrumental in
the reattainment of maritime power.
Presently we have apparently decided to consolidate
the gains which were produced in our shipping industry by
the new policies and by the necessities of war. Alarmed by
the reversal of trend, which showed us immediately after
the War carrying a larger percentage of our foreign trade
than we had in many years, the Congress has been eminently
generous, and the Maritime Commission has returned to its
orignal realism, which recognized that the American dollar
is after all the determinant for success in the private
shipping field. It is to be hoped that this trend twward
active participation and help will continue, and that we
will not again at some future date be faced with a dwindling
marine, and the necessities which make it unadaptable to
our national needs.
The subsidy program has become a fixture in our economy,
unless present thinking be drastically revised. There is no
present indication that such a forthright and unwarranted
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change in policy is planned, and we can therefore hope to
be permanently assured of the marine to which our tradition
entitles us and which our economy demands.
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